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MATHEMATICS OF MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE UNDER
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
UMUT C¸ETIN
1. Motivation
A vast number of financial assets change hands every day and, as a result, the prices of
these assets fluctuate continuously. What drives the asset prices is the expectation of the
assets’ future payoffs and a price is set when a buyer and a seller agree on an exchange.
At any given point in time, usually there are numerous agents in the market who are inter-
ested in trading. Some agents are individuals with relatively small portfolios while others
are investments banks or hedge funds who are acting on behalf of large corporations or a
collection of individuals. Obviously, these agents have different attitudes toward risk and
do not have equal access to trading technologies, information or other relevant resources.
Moreover, it is very rare that the cumulative demand of the buyers will be met by the total
shares offered by the sellers without any excess supply. An imbalance of demand and supply
is the rule rather than an exception in today’s markets, which brings liquidity risk to the
fore. These features of the modern markets challenge the conventional asset pricing theories
which assume perfect competition and no liquidity risk.
Market microstructure theory provides an alternative to frictionless models of trading
behaviour that assume perfect competition and free entry. To quote O’Hara [25], “[It] is
the study of the process and outcomes of exchanging assets under explicit trading rules.”
Thus, market microstructure analyses how a specific trading mechanism or heterogeneity of
traders affect the price formation, comes up with measures for market liquidity and studies
the sensitivity of liquidity and other indicators of market behaviour on different trading
mechanisms and information heterogeneity.
The primary goal of Market Microstructure (MS) models is to understand the temporary
and permanent impacts of the trades on the asset price and how the price-setting rules
evolve in time. In real markets bid and ask prices are announced by specialists or dealers,
whom we will collectively call market makers henceforth. The early literature on market
microstructure ([17], [28], [1], and [18]) have started with the simple observation that the
trades could involve some implicit costs due to the need for immediate execution, which is
provided by the market makers. At the same time, the market makers take into account their
inventory level when making pricing decisions. These works have concluded that the market
makers adjust the prices in order to keep their inventories around a certain level in the long
run: they lower the price when their inventory levels are too high and raise the prices when
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they are short large quantities. As the market makers want to keep their inventories around
a fixed level, the impact of trades are transitory since the prices are also expected to mean
revert.
The MS research have later shifted its focus to models with asymmetric information,
which account for permanent changes in the price. The canonical model of markets with
asymmetric information is due to Kyle [21]. Kyle studies a market for a single risky asset
whose price is determined in equilibrium in discrete time. The key feature of this model is
that the market makers cannot distinguish between the informed and uninformed trades and
compete to fill the net demand. In this model market makers ‘learn from the net demand
by ‘filtering what the informed trader knows, which is ‘corrupted’ by the demand of the
uninformed traders. The market makers learn from the order flow and they update their
pricing strategies as a result of this learning mechanism.
To get a flavour of the Kyle model suppose that there is an asset whose value V will be
revealed at time 1. Assume further the existence of an insider who knows the value of V
at time 0. To simplify the matters the insider will be allowed to trade once at time 0 and
liquidate her position at time 1.
At time 0 there are also noise traders who are not strategic and their cumulative demand
for the asset is given by ν ∼ N(0, σ2n). Consistent with the term ’noise’ ν is assumed to be
independent of V .
If the insider trades θ many shares, the market makers observe the net demand Y := θ+n
and take the opposite side to clear the market by setting a price. They know the distribution
of V but no other relevant information regarding its value. The market makers are risk
neutral and compete in a Bertrand fashion to fill the aggregate order Y . That is, the price
h(y) chosen by the market makers for Y = y is such that their expected profit is 0. Since
they will also liquidate their position at time 1 at price V , this implies
(1.1) h(y) = E[V |Y = y].
Given this pricing rule y 7→ h(y) the insider needs to find her optimal trading amount.
Suppose further that V ∼ N(µ, σ2). We are interested in a Nash-type equilibrium: (θ, h)
will constitute and equilibrium if
(1) Given h, θ maximises the expected profit of the insider;
(2) Given θ, h satsifies (1.1).
Let us now prove that a linear equilibrium in which h(y) = a + by and θ = α + βV exists.
First observe that if h(y) = a + λy, the insider’s optimisation problem given V = v is
max
α,β
E[(α + βv)(v − a− λ(ν + α+ βv)).
The profit/loss is quadratic in parameters and the first order condition yields:
(1.2) α + βv =
v − a
2λ
.
On the other hand, (1.1) requires
a + λY = E[V |Y ].
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Now, since (V, ν) is a Gaussian vector, the conditional distribution of V given Y is also
Gaussian, which can be determined by Bayes’ rule. Formally,
P (V ∈ dv|Y = y) = P (Y ∈ dy|V = v)P (V ∈ dv)
P (Y ∈ dy) ∼ P (Y ∈ dy|V = v)P (V ∈ dv).
Moreover, given V = v, Y = ν + α + βV ∼ N(α + βv, σ2ν). Thus, P (Y ∈ dy|V = v) is
proportional to
exp
(
−(y − α− βv)
2
2σ2ν
)
.
Hence,
P (V ∈ dv|Y = y) ∼ exp
(
−(y − α− βv)
2
2σ2ν
− v
2
2σ2
)
∼ exp(−(v − µˆ)
2
2Σ2
),
where
1
Σ2
=
1
σ2
+
β2
σ2ν
, µˆ = β(y − α)Σ
2
σ2Z
.
That is, V is Gaussian with mean µˆ and variance Σ2 given Y = y. Thus,
a+ λy = β(y − α)Σ
2
σ2Z
= β(y − α) σ
2
β2σ2 + σ2ν
,
which in turn yields
λ =
βσ2
β2σ2 + σ2ν
and a = −αλ.
Recall that (1.2) implies 2λβ = 1. Thus,
βσ2 =
βσ2
2
+
σ2Z
2β
.
Consequently, β = σν
σ
and λ = σ
2σν
. The remaining two equations for a and α are satisfied
only if a = α = 0.
Question 1. What is the interpretation of equilibrium values of λ and β?
Question 2. Without making all the calculations above can you guess the equilibrium value
of a and α if the mean of V were different than 0?
Value of information: Given the above explicit characterisation of equilibrium we can
compute the equilibrium level of wealth of the insider, which is given by
(1− λβ)βv2 = βv
2
2
Thus, the ex-ante, i.e. unconditional, value of information equals
(1.3) β
σ2
2
=
σσν
2
.
Question 3. What is the interpretation of (1.3)?
4 UMUT C¸ETIN
2. Kyle model in continuous time
If a trader has some private information regarding the future value of the asset, she would
like to take advantage of this and trade dynamically, not just once as above. The continuous
time version of the Kyle model is formalised by K. Back [2]. Although in the literature it
is usually assumed that the informed investor knows the future asset value perfectly, this is
not a necessary assumption as we shall soon see.
Let us suppose that the time-1 value of the traded asset is given by some random variable
V , which will become public knowledge at t = 1 to all market participants.
We shall work on a filtered probability space (Ω,G, (Gt)t∈[0,1],Q).
Three types of agents trade in the market. They differ in their information sets, and
objectives, as follows.
• Noise/liquidity traders trade for liquidity reasons, and their total demand at time t
is given by a standard (Gt)-Brownian motion B independent of Z. (We normalise
the variance of the noise trades so that it is given by a Brownian motion with unit
variance)
• Market makers observe only the total demand
Y = θ +B,
where θ is the demand process of the informed trader. The admissibility condition
imposed later on θ will entail in particular that Y is a semimartingale.
They set the price of the risky asset via a Bertrand competition and clear the
market. We assume that the market makers set the price as a function of the total
order process at time t, i.e. we consider pricing functionals S
(
Y[0,t], t
)
of the following
form
(2.4) S
(
Y[0,t], t
)
= H (t, Yt) , ∀t ∈ [0, 1).
Moreover, a pricing rule H has to be admissible in the sense of Definition 1. In
particular, H ∈ C1,2 and, therefore, S will be a semimartingale as well.
• The informed trader (insider) observes the price process St = H (t, Yt) and her private
signal, Z. Based in her signal, she makes an educated guess about V . Thus, there
exists a measurable function f such that
f(Z) = E[V |Z].
We assume that Z is a continuous random variable and f is continuous. Thus,
without loss of generality we can take Z to be a standard Normal random variable
- possibly the time-1 value of some Brownian motion. Moreover, f can be taken
strictly increasing (why?). This entails in particular that the larger the signal Z the
larger the value of the risky asset for the informed trader.
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She is assumed to be risk-neutral, her objective is to maximize the expected final
wealth.
sup
θ∈A(H)
E0,z
[
W θ1
]
, where
W θ1 = (V − S1−))θ1− +
∫ 1−
0
θs−dSs.
However, using the tower property of conditional expectations, the above problem is
equivalent to
sup
θ∈A(H)
E0,z
[
W θ1
]
, where(2.5)
W θ1 = (f(Z)− S1−)θ1− +
∫ 1−
0
θs−dSs.(2.6)
In above A(H) is the set of admissible trading strategies for the given pricing rule1 H ,
which will be defined in Definition 2. Moreover, E0,z is the expectation with respect
to P 0,z, which is the probability measure on σ(Ys, Z; s ≤ 1) generated by (Y, Z) with
Y0 = 0 and Z = z.
Thus, the insider maximises the expected value of her final wealth W θ1 , where the
first term on the right hand side of equation (2.5) is the contribution to the final
wealth due to a potential differential between the market price and the fundamental
value or insider’s private valuation at the time of information release, and the second
term is the contribution to the final wealth coming from the trading activity.
Given the above market structure we can now precisely define the filtrations of the market
makers and of the informed trader. As we shall require them to satisfy the usual conditions,
we first define the probability measures that will be used in the completion of their filtrations.
First define F := σ(Bt, Z; t ≤ 1) and let P 0,z be the probability measure on F generated
by (B,Z) with B0 = 0 and Z = z. Also define the probability measure P on (Ω,F) by
(2.7) P(E) =
∫
R
Q0,z(E)Q(Z0 ∈ dz),
for any E ∈ F .
2.1. Some technicalities regarding filtrations and null sets. While P 0,z is how the
informed trader assign likelihood to the events generated by B and Z, P is the probability
distribution of the market makers who do not observe Z0 exactly. Thus, the market makers’
filtration, denoted by FM , will be the right-continuous augmentation with the P-null sets of
the filtration generated by Y .
On the other hand, since the informed trader knows the value of Z0 perfectly, it is plausible
to assume that her filtration is augmented with the P 0,z-null sets. However, this will make
the modelling cumbersome since the filtration will have an extra dependence on the value of
1Note that this implies the insider’s optimal trading strategy takes into account the feedback effect, i.e.
that prices react to her trading strategy.
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Z0 purely for technical reasons. Another natural choice is to consider the intersection of all
these augmentations. That is,
F It = ∩z∈RF I,zt ,
where F I,zt is the usual augmentation of the filtration generated by Z and S and completed
with the null sets of P 0,z.
Key observation for the filtrations: The filtration of the insider is the enlargement of the
market filtration with her own signal Z.
Key observation for the probability measures: The probability measure of the insider is
singular with respect to the probability measure of the market makers. Indeed, P 0,z(F (Z) =
f(z)) = 1 while P(f(Z) = f(z)) = 0.
2.2. Definition of equilibrium. We are finally in a position to give a rigorous definition
of the rational expectations equilibrium of this market, i.e. a pair consisting of an admissible
pricing rule and an admissible trading strategy such that: a) given the pricing rule the
trading strategy is optimal, b) given the trading strategy, the pricing rule is rational in the
following sense:
(2.8) H(t, Yt) = St = E
[
f(Z1)|FMt
]
,
where E corresponds to the expectation operator under P. To formalize this definition of
equilibrium, we first define the sets of admissible pricing rules and trading strategies.
Definition 1. An admissible pricing rule is any function H fulfilling the following conditions:
(1) H ∈ C1,2([0, 1)× R).
(2) x 7→ H(t, x) is strictly increasing for every t ∈ [0, 1);
Remark 1. The strict monotonicity of H in the space variable implies H is invertible prior
to time 1, thus, the filtration of the insider is generated by Y and Z. This in turn implies
that (FS,Zt ) = (FB,Zt ), i.e. the insider has full information about the market.
In view of the above one can take F It = FB,Zt for all t ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 2. An FB,Z-adapted θ is said to be an admissible trading strategy for a given
pricing rule H if
(1) θ is a semimartingale on (Ω,F , (FB,Zt ), Q0,z) with summable jumps for each z ∈ R,
(2) and no doubling strategies are allowed, i.e. for all z ∈ R
(2.9) E0,z
[∫ 1
0
H2 (t, Xt) dt
]
<∞.
The set of admissible trading strategies for the given H is denoted with A(H).
It is standard (see, e.g., [4] or [30]) in the insider trading literature to limit the set of
admissible strategies to absolutely continuous ones motivated by the result in Back [2]. We
will prove this in Theorem 1 that the insider does not make any extra gain if she does not
employ continuous strategies of finite variation.
In view of the above discussion we can limit the admissible strategies of the insider to the
absolutely continuous ones denoted by Ac(H). Indeed, Theorem 1 shows that under a mild
condition the value function of the insider is unchanged if the insider is only allowed to use
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absolutely continuous strategies. Moreover, even if these conditions are not met, Theorem
1 also demonstrates that an absolutely continuous strategy that brings the market price to
the fundamental value of the asset is optimal within A. In the models that we consider in
the following chapters such a strategy will always exist and the equilibrium pricing rule will
satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1. Consequently the restriction to Ac is without loss of
generality.
Now we can formally define the market equilibrium as follows.
Definition 3. A couple (H∗θ∗) is said to form an equilibrium if H∗ is an admissible pricing
rule, θ∗ ∈ Ac(H∗), and the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) Market efficiency condition: given θ∗, H∗ is a rational pricing rule, i.e. it satisfies
(2.8).
(2) Insider optimality condition: given H∗, θ∗ solves the insider optimization problem:
E[W θ
∗
1 ] = sup
θ∈Ac(H∗)
E[W θ1 ].
3. On insider’s optimal strategy
Before showing that the strategies with discontinuous paths or with paths of infinite varia-
tion are suboptimal let us informally deduce the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellmann (HJB) equation
associated to the value function of the insider assuming absolutely continuous trading strate-
gies.
Let H be any rational pricing rule and suppose that dθt = αtdt. First, notice that a
standard application of integration-by-parts formula applied to W θ1 gives
(3.10) W θ1 =
∫ 1
0
(f(Z1)− Ss)αs ds.
Furthermore,
(3.11) E0,z
[∫ 1
0
(f(Z1)− Ss)αsds
]
= E0,z
[∫ 1
0
(f(z)− Ss)αsds
]
.
In view of (3.10) and (3.11), insider’s optimization problem becomes
(3.12) sup
θ
E0,z[W θ1 ] = sup
θ
E0,z
[∫ 1
0
(f(z)−H(s, Ys))αsds
]
.
Let us now introduce the value function of the insider:
φ(t, y, z) := ess supαE
0,z
[∫ 1
t
(f(z)−H(s, Ys))αsds|Yt = y, Z = z
]
, t ∈ [0, 1].
Applying formally the dynamic programming principle, we get the following HJB equation:
(3.13) 0 = sup
α
([φy + f(z)−H(t, y)]α) + φt + 1
2
φyy.
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Thus, for the finiteness of the value function and the existence of an optimal α we need
φy + f(z)−H(t, y) = 0(3.14)
φt +
1
2
φyy = 0.(3.15)
Differentiating (3.14) with respect to y and since from (3.14) it follows that φy = H(t, y)−
f(z), we get
(3.16) φyy = Hy(t, y), φyyy = Hyy.
Since differentiation (3.14) with respect to t gives
φyt = Ht(t, y),
(3.16) implies after differentiating (3.15) with respect to y
(3.17) Ht(t, y) +
1
2
Hyy(t, y) = 0.
Thus, the last two equations seem to be necessary to have a finite solution to the insider’s
problem.
The next result shows that the equation (3.17) also implies the insider must use continuous
strategies of finite variation.
Theorem 1. Let H be an admissible pricing rule satisfying (3.17). Then θ ∈ A(H) is an
optimal strategy if
i) θ is continuous and of finite variation,
ii) and H(1−, Y1−) = f(Z), P 0,z-a.s..
Moreover, if we further assume that H is bounded, then there exists an admissible abso-
lutely continuous strategy θ such that
sup
θ∈A(H)
E0,z
[
W θ1
]
= E0,z
[
W θ1
]
.
The proof of this theorem and construction of the equilibrium in the Kyle model will be
given after we collect some machinery. As seen from the statement the insider must use a
bridge strategy when trading optimally. This requires certain results on the conditioning of
diffusion processes. While doing so we shall also pay attention to its connection with the
theory of enlargement of filtrations since the insider’s filtration is the enlargement of the
filtration of market makers. Also note that the rationality of market makers’ pricing rule
means they need to compute the conditional distribution of Z given the history of Y . Thus,
we will need to review the basics of stochastic filtering, at least in the context of Gaussian
processes.
4. Stochastic filtering
Suppose that we are given on a filtered probability space an adapted process of interest,
X = (Xt)0≤t≤T , called the signal process, for a deterministic T . The problem is that the
signal cannot be observed directly and all we can see is an adapted observation process
Y = (Yt)0≤t≤T . The filtering is concerned with finding E[f(Xt)|FYt ], where FY is the minimal
filtration generated by Y and satisfying the usual hypotheses, and f is a measurable function.
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Remark 2. There is a problem with the definition of the process (E[f(Xt)|FYt ])0≤t≤T as
the conditional expectation E[f(Xt)|FYt ] is only defined a.s. and there are uncountably many
t between 0 and T ! However, there exists a process, let’s denote it with f o, called the FY -
optional projection of f(X), which satisfies f ot = E[f(Xt)|FYt ], for every t (and some more).
Moreover, f o is uniquely defined. Thus, whenever we define a process by (E[Ht|FYt ])0≤t≤T , we
shall always mean, and use, the FY -optional projection of H. The F Y -optional projection
of H will be denoted with Ĥ. See the second volume of Rogers and Williams for more
details. We also suppose the filtration supports two Brownian motions, W and B, such that
d[W,B]t = ρtdt, for some predictable process ρ.
4.1. The innovations approach to nonlinear filtering. Let’s suppose the observation
process is of the form
(4.18) Yt =
∫ t
0
hsds+Wt,
where W is a standard Brownian motion and h is an adapted process such that
(4.19) E
(∫ T
0
h2sds
)
<∞.
The main result of nonlinear filtering theory is the following:
Theorem 2. (Fujisaki, Kallianpur and Kunita)
(1) The process N defined by
(4.20) Nt = Yt −
∫ t
0
ĥsds,
for each t ∈ [0, T ], is an FY -Brownian motion.
(2) If M is an L2-bounded FY -martingale with M0 = 0, then there exists an FY -
predictable process C such that
E
(∫ T
0
C2sds
)
<∞,
and that
Zt =
∫ t
0
CsdNs.
The F Y -Brownian motion N is called the innovation process in filtering literature.
Proof. Let S be an FY stopping time. Since we only observe Y over the finite interval [0, T ],
S ≤ T , hence bounded. Let N∗T = supt≤T |Nt|. Note that N∗T is dominated by the random
variable
W ∗T +
∫ T
0
{
|hs|+ |ĥs|
}
ds,
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which is square integrable due to (4.19). Thus, NS is also integrable and
E(NS) = E
{
WS +
∫ S
0
(hs − ĥs)ds
}
=
∫ T
0
E
[
(hs − ĥs)1[s≤S]
]
ds = 0,
where we used the optional stopping theorem for E[WS ] in order to get the first equality, the
fact that ĥs = E[hs|FYs ] and [s ≤ S] ∈ FYs to arrive at the last equality. This shows N is
an FY -martingale. Since [N,N ]t = t, for every t ∈ [0, T ], this shows N is an FY -Brownian
motion by Le´vy’s characterisation. See Rogers and Williams [27] Chapter VI.8 for the proof
of the second part. 
Let the signal process X have the following differential:
(4.21) dXt = αtdt+ ηtdBt,
where α is adapted and η is predictable. We further suppose
E
(∫ T
0
α2sds
)
<∞,
and
sup
t∈[0,T ]
EX2t <∞.
Theorem 3. Let X and Y be as above. Then we have the following fitering equations:
X̂t = X̂0 +
∫ t
0
α̂sds+
∫ t
0
{
X̂shs − X̂sĥs + η̂sρs
}
dNs.
Proof. First notice that if C is an adapted process such that
E
∫ T
0
|Cs|ds <∞,
and if Vt =
∫ t
0
Csds, then
(4.22) V̂t −
∫ t
0
Ĉsds is an FY -martingale.
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In order to prove this it suffices to prove for any FY -stopping time S ≤ T , EV̂S = E
∫ S
0
Ĉsds.
Indeed,
EV̂S = EVS = E
∫ S
0
Csds
=
∫ T
0
E
[
1[s≤S]Cs
]
ds
=
∫ T
0
E
[
1[s≤S]Ĉs
]
ds
= E
∫ S
0
Ĉsds.
This in turn implies
Mt := X̂t − X̂0 −
∫ t
0
α̂sds,
is an FY martingale with M0 = 0. Moreover, it is an L2-bounded martingale due to the
assumed integrability conditions on α and X . Thus, by Theorem 2 there exists a predictable
process φ such that
Mt =
∫ t
0
φsdNs.
Next, we shall calculate the martingale M explicitly. In order to do this we will calculate
the optional projection of XY in two different ways. Using integration by parts
XtYt =
∫ t
0
XsdYs +
∫ t
0
YsdXs + [X, Y ]t
=
∫ t
0
{Xshs + Ysαs + ηsρs} ds+ F -martingale.
Therefore, using (4.22)
(4.23) X̂tYt = X̂tYt =
∫ t
0
{
X̂shs + Ysα̂s + η̂sρs
}
ds+ FY -martingale.
The other way is the following:
X̂tYt =
∫ t
0
X̂tdYs +
∫ t
0
YsdX̂s + [Xˆ, Y ]t
=
∫ t
0
X̂t
{
dNs + ĥsds
}
+
∫ t
0
Ys {dMs + α̂sds}+ [M,N ]t
=
∫ t
0
{
X̂sĥs + Ysα̂s + φs
}
ds+ FY -martingale(4.24)
(4.23) and (4.24) together imply∫ t
0
{
X̂sĥs + Ysα̂s + φs
}
ds−
∫ t
0
{
X̂shs + Ysα̂s + η̂sρs
}
ds
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is an FY -martingale, thus, must be zero being, of finite variation. This implies
φs = X̂shs − X̂sĥs + η̂sρs,
for each s. This proves the desired filtering equation. 
4.2. The Markov case. Observe that we have not made any Markov assumption on X or
Y . We will now take a look at this special case and obtain equations that determine the
conditional distribution of X .
Let’s suppose X is a diffusion with generator L:
L =
1
2
σ2(x)
d2
dx2
+ b(x)
d
dx
.
We will also suppose that B and W are independent for simplicity and hs = h(Xs) and
E
[∫ T
0
h2s ds
]
<∞.
Then, using the already obtained formulas we obtain the following
Theorem 4. Let f ∈ C2K and define pitf = E[f(Xt)|FYt ]. Then,
pitf = pi0f +
∫ t
0
pisLf ds+
∫ t
0
{pishf − pishpisf} dNs.
The equation in the above theorem is called Kushner-Stratonovic equations or simply
filtering equations.
Exercise 1. Suppose that W and B are not independent but d[W,B]t = ρ(Xt, Yt)dt for some
measurable function ρ(x, y) which is bounded when x belongs to a bounded interval. Obtain
the filtering equations in this setting.
Exercise 2. Extend the filtering equations to a multidimensional setting.
4.3. Kalman-Bucy filter. Kalman-Bucy filter is a celebrated example of filtering which
finds widespread use in real-world problems. In particular, it will be essential for the solution
of the equilibirum in Kyle model.
We assume the signal process satisfies an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck SDE:
Xt = X0 +Bt +
∫ t
0
aXsds,
where X0 is a normal random variable, and the observation process is given by
Yt =Wt +
∫ t
0
cXsds.
We assume W and B are independent so that ρ ≡ 0. Since the bivariate process (X, Y ) is
Gaussian, the conditional distribution of X given Y is also Gaussian. The mean is given by
X̂ which is given by
X̂t = EX0 +
∫ t
0
aX̂sds+ c
∫ t
0
{
X̂2s − (X̂s)2
}
dNs
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by Theorem 3. Let vt := E[(Xt − X̂t)2|FYt ] be the conditional variance of Xt given FYt . I.e.
vt = X̂2t − (X̂t)2. Next, let’s find the filtering equation for X̂2t . Again, using Itoˆ’s formula
and Theorem 3
X̂2t = EX
2
0 +
∫ t
0
(1 + 2aX̂2s)ds+ c
∫ t
0
{
X̂3s − X̂2s X̂s
}
dNs.
Recall that for Z ∼ N(µ, σ2), EZ3 = µ(µ2 + 3σ2). Thus, since Xt is conditionally Gaussian,
X̂3s − X̂2s X̂s = X̂s
(
X̂2s + 3vs − X̂2s
)
= 2vsX̂s.
Thus,
dvt = d(X̂
2
t − X̂2t )
= 2cvtX̂tdNt + (1 + 2aX̂2t )dt− 2X̂t(cvtdNt + aX̂tdt)− c2v2t dt
= (1 + 2avt − c2v2t )dt,
so that v solves an ordinary differential equation. This differential equation has a solution.
If β > 0 and −γ < 0 are two roots of the quadratic 1 + 2ax − c2x2, and if λ = c2(β + γ),
then
vt =
δβeλt − γ
δeλt + 1
, where
δ =
σ2 + γ
β − σ2 ,
and σ2 = var(X0). Note that v(∞) = β.
Exercise 3. Let X be the unobserved signal given by
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
σ(s)dWs, ∀t ∈ [0, 1],
where X0 is a normal random variable with mean zero and variance s(0), and σ is a contin-
uous and deterministic function such that∫ 1
0
σ2(s)ds <∞.
There also exists an observation process Y given by
Yt = Bt +
∫ t
0
Xs − Ys
f(s)
ds,
where f is a deterministic continuous function. Suppose B andW are independent Brownian
motions.
a) Find the equation for Xˆ given the observation process Y .
b) Let v(t) := E[(Xt − X̂t)2|FYt ] where FY is the filtration generated by Y and X̂t =
E[Xt|FYt ]. Show that v solves the differential equation
f 2(t)v′(t) + v2(t) = σ2(t)f 2(t).
(Hint: If Z ∼ N(µ, σ2) then EZ3 = µ(µ2 + 3σ2).)
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c) Let s(t) := s(0) +
∫ t
0
σ2(s)ds. Suppose f(t) = s(t) − t and s(t) − t ≥ 0. Using the
differential equation above show that, given FYt , Xt is a normal random variable with
mean X̂t and variance s(t)− t. Also show that X̂ is a Brownian motion.
Finally, Liptser and Shiryaev [22] is an excellent source for the fundamentals of stochastic
filtering. It includes the results above and many more!
5. Diffusion bridges
By a diffusion bridge we usually understand a conditioning of a given diffusion process to
arrive at a fixed given value at some future time. The most well-known of such bridges is
the Brownian bridge. More precisely, if B is a standard Brownian motion and x ∈ R, we can
construct a process Xx such that the distribution of Xx is that of B conditioned on B1 = x.
Note that since P (B1 = x) = 0, the law of Brownian bridge is not absolutely continuous to
that of B. However, we shall see that
Law(Xxs ; s ≤ t) ∼ Law(Bs; s ≤ t), ∀t < 1.
One way to construct such a bridge is to define
(5.25) Xxt := Bt + (x− B1)t.
The above constructs a Gaussian process with E[Xxt ] = xt, continuous on [0.1], and for s < t
Cov(Xxs , X
x
t ) = E[(Bt − tB1)(Bs − sB1)] = s(1− t).
To show that the above construction indeed is the desired Brownian bridge, let us verify
that Bt conditioned on B1 = x has the above covariance structure and has the same mean.
Indeed,
(5.26) P (Bs ∈ dy, Bt ∈ dz|B1 = x) = p(s, x)p(t− s, z − y)p(1− t, x− z)
p(1, x)
dydz,
where p(·, ·) is the transition density of B, i.e.
p(s, y − z)dy = P (Bt+s ∈ dy|Bt = z) = 1√
2pis
exp
(
−(y − z)
2
2s
)
.
Exercise 4. Using (5.26) show that E[Bt|B1 = x] = tx and Cov(Bs, Bt) = s(1 − t) for
s < t < 1.
However, the above construction is not adapted to the filtration of (Bt) and requires the
knowledge of B1. As such, this will not be useful to construct the bridge in the Kyle model
since although the insider observes B continuously in time she does not know the value of
B1 at time t < 1.
The second construction of a Brownian bridge uses SDEs. Consider
(5.27) Xxt = Bt +
∫ t
0
x−Xxs
1− s ds.
Its unique solution is given by
(5.28) Xxt = xt + (1− t)
∫ t
0
1
1− sdBs
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Exercise 5. Verify the above using integration by parts.
It is clear from (5.28) that E[Xxt ] = xt. Moreover,
Cov(Xxs , X
x
t ) = (1−s)(1−t)E
[∫ s
0
1
1− rdBr
∫ t
0
1
1− rdBr
]
= (1−s)(1−t)
∫ s
0
1
(1− r)2dr = s(1−t).
It remains to show that Xx is continuous on [0, 1]. Continuity on [0, 1) is clear. What is left
to show is that Xxt → x as t→ 1.
Exercise 6. Show that P (limt→1X
x
t = x) = 1, where X
x is defined by (5.28) by observing
that ∫ t
0
1
1− sdBs
d
= W t
1−t
,
where W is some Brownian motion. Use also the fact that limt→∞
Wt
t
= 0 with probability 1
for any Brownian motion.
Exercise 7. Show that the solution of (5.27) is a semimartingale. (Hint: Compute E[|x −
Xxt ].)
We have performed two different constructions of a Brownian bridge. Are there indeed
very different or is there a link between them other than that they have the same distribution.
To answer this question let us recall that the first construction is not adapted and depends
on the knowledge of B1. Let us now see what happens to B if we enlarge its filtration with
B1. Let (Ft)t→1 be the natural filtration of B and Gt denote Ft∨σ(B1) following the approach
of Mansuy and Yor [24]. To compute the decomposition of B under Gt, take a text function
g and a set A ∈ Fs and consider
Mt := E[g(B1)|Ft] =
∫
g(y)p(1− t, y −Bt)dy.
If we apply the Ito formula to p and note that pt =
1
2
pxx, we obtain
Mt =Ms −
∫ t
s
∫
g(y)px(1− t, y − Br)dydr.
Thus,
E[(Bt − Bs)g(B1)1A] = E[(Bt − Bs)M11A]
= E[(Bt − Bs)Mt1A]
= E [([M,B]t − [M,B]s)1A]
= −E
[
1A
∫ t
s
∫
g(y)px(1− t, y −Br)dydr
]
= −E
[
1A
∫ t
s
∫
g(y)
px(1− t, y −Br)
p(1− t, y −Br) p(1− t, y −Br)dydr
]
= −E
[
1A
∫ t
s
g(B1)
px(1− t, B1 − Br)
p(1− t, B1 − Br) dr
]
= −E
[
1Ag(B1)
∫ t
s
px(1− t, B1 − Br)
p(1− t, B1 − Br) dr
]
.
16 UMUT C¸ETIN
However, the above implies that
βt := Bt +
∫ t
0
px(1− t, B1 −Br)
p(1− t, B1 − Br) dr
is a Gt-martingale. In view of Le`vy’s characterisation of Brownian motion, β must be a
Gt-Brownian motion. Moreover,
px(t, y)
p(t, y)
= −y
t
.
Thus,
Bt = βt +
∫ t
0
B1 − Br
1− r dr,
where β is a G-Brownian motion. Now, if we plug this into (5.25), we obtain
Xxt = βt +
∫ t
0
{
x−B1 + B1 −Br
1− r
}
dr
= βt +
∫ t
0
x− xr + rB1 − Br
1− r dr = βt +
∫ t
0
x− (Br + r(x−B1))
1− r dr
= βt +
∫ t
0
x−Xxr
1− r dr,
which is a weak solution of (5.27).
5.1. Absolute continuity of laws and bridges of general diffusions. Clearly, the
probability law of Brownian bridge is not absolutely continuous with respect to that of
Brownian motion when we consider the whole trajectory from 0 to 1. However, this does
not imply the singularity of laws when the trajectories are confined to intervals of the form
[0, T ] for T < 1.
Indeed, if we consider (5.26) and compare it with the corresponding law for Brownian
motion, we may conjecture that the law P 0→x0→1 induced by the Brownian bridge on the space
of continuous functions admits
dP 0→x0→1
dP 0
∣∣
FT
= p(1− T, x−XT ), T < 1,
where P 0 is the law induced by the Brownian motion starting at 0 and X is the coordinate
process.
This guess can be verified by Girsanov transformation. To this end observe that Mt :=
p(1 − t, x − Bt) is a bounded martingale on [0, T ] for T < 1. Thus, if define a probability
measure Q on FT by
dQ
dP
=MT ,
Girsanov theorem implies that B follows under Q the following dynamics:
Bt = βt +
∫ t
0
x− Bs
1− s ds
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for some Q-Brownian motion β. That is, B under Q is a weak solution of (5.27). Since the
strong uniqueness holds on [0, T ], so does weak uniqueness. This in particular implies the
aforementioned absolute continuity.
The above procedure also hints us how to proceed in order to construct a bridge of a given
diffusion. To make the construction precise suppose that X is the unique solution of
Xt = y +
∫ t
0
σ(Xs)dBs +
∫ t
0
b(Xs)ds,
for some functions σ and b. Suppose that the coefficients of the SDE are reqular enough so
that the solution admits a transition density with respect to Lebesgue measure. Let p(t, y, z)
denote this density. That is,
p(t, y, z)dz = P (Xs+t ∈ dz|Xs = y).
If we impose more conditions on the SDE, we can ensure that for any z the mapping (t, y) 7→
p(t, y, z) is smooth enough to apply Ito’s formula. Let’s suppose this is the case so that
Mt := p(1− t, Xt, x) =M0 +
∫ t
0
py(1− s,Xs, x)σ(Xs)dBs
is a martingale on [0, T ] for any T < 1. Thus, Girsanov theorem yields a QT on F defined
by
dQT
dP
=
MT
M0
under which X follows
Xt = y +
∫ t
0
σ(Xs)dβs +
∫ t
0
{
b(Xs) + σ
2(Xs)
py(1− s,Xs, x)
p(1− s,Xs, x)
}
ds, t < T.
It can be fairly easily shown that QT converges to some measure Q, which we would like
to identify with the law of X conditioned to be equal to x at time 1. This requires certain
measure theoretic technicalities and is beyond the scope of these notes. However, under
fairly mild conditions, this can be done (see [11]) and the above recipe for the SDE for X
conditioned to arrive (continuously) at x at time 1 therefore works.
A well-known example of the above construction is the 3-dimensional Bessel bridge. That
is, for x ≥ 0,
Xt = x+
∫ t
0
1
Xs
ds.
The solution of the above SDE never hits 0 after its initiation and converges to∞ as t→∞.
But we can condition X so that it converges to 0 at time 1 using the above recipe. There is
a slight difficulty here since p(1− t, y, 0) = 0 (see Section XI.1 of Revuz and Yor [?] for the
exact description of this density). To circumvent this, define
Mt = h(t, Xt),
where
h(t, y) = lim
z→0
p(1− t, y, z)
p(1, x, z)
.
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In this case,
lim
x→0
hy(t, y)
h(t, y)
= − y
1 − t .
Thus, the corresponding SDE for the 3-dimensional Bessel bridge from x to 0 is given by
(5.29) Xt = x+Bt +
∫ t
0
{
1
Xs
− Xs
1− s
}
ds.
Remark 3. A similar connection with the enlargement of filtration theory exists in the case
of general diffusions as well. Under certain integrability conditions and by repeating the same
argument we used for Brownian motion we can show that
dXt = σ(Xt)dβt +
{
b(Xt) + σ
2(Xt)
py(1− t, Xt, X1)
p(1− t, Xt, X1)
}
dt,
where β is a G-Brownian motion while Gt = FXt ∨ σ(X1).
6. Proof of Theorem 1
Given that we have the required machinery we can now return to the Kyle model and
finds its equilibrium. Our first task is to prove Theorem 1.
Using Ito’s formula for general semimartingales (see, e.g. Theorem II.32 in [26]) we obtain
dH(t, Yt) = Ht(t, Yt−)dt+Hy(t, Yt−)dYt +
1
2
Hyy(t, Yt−)d[Y, Y ]
c
t
+ {H(t, Yt)−H(t, Yt−)−Hy(t, Yt−)∆Yt}
= Hx(t, Yt−)w(t, Yt−)dY
c
t + dFVt,
where FV is of finite variation. Therefore,
(6.30) [θ, S]ct =
∫ t
0
Hy(s, Ys−)d[Y
c, θ]s =
∫ t
0
Hy(s, Ys−) {d[B, θ]s + d[θ, θ]cs} .
Moreover, integrating (2.6) by parts (see Corollary 2 of Theorem II.22 in [26]) we get
(6.31) W θ1 = f(Z1)θ1− −
∫ 1−
0
H(t, Yt−))dθt − [θ,H(·, Y )]1−
since the jumps of θ are summable.
Consider the function
(6.32) Ψa(t, x) :=
∫ x
ξ(t,a)
(H(t, u)− a)du+ 1
2
∫ 1
t
Hy(s, ξ(s, a))ds
where ξ(t, a) is the unique solution of H(t, ξ(t, a)) = a. Direct differentiation with respect
to x gives that
(6.33) Ψax(t, x) = H(t, x)− a.
Differentiating above with respect to x gives
(6.34) Ψaxx(t, x) = Hx(t, x).
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Direct differentiation of Ψa(t, x) with respect to t gives
Ψat (t, x) =
∫ x
ξ(t,a)
Ht(t, u)
w(t, u)
du− 1
2
Hx(t, ξ(t, a))w(t, ξ(t, a))
= −1
2
Hx(t, x).
Combining the above with (6.34) gives
(6.35) Ψat +
1
2
w(t, x)2Ψaxx = 0.
Applying Ito’s formula we deduce
dΨa(t, Yt) = Ψt(t, Yt−)dt+ (H(t, Yt−)− a)dY ct
+
1
2
Ψxx(t, Yt−)d[Y, Y ]
c
t +Ψ
a(t, Yt)−Ψa(t, Yt−)
= (H(t, Yt−)− a) dY ct +
1
2
Ψxx(t, Yt−) (d[Y, Y ]
c
t − dt)
+Ψa(t, Yt)−Ψa(t, Yt−)
= (H(t, Yt−)− a) dY ct +
1
2
Hy(t, Yt−)(d[Y, Y ]
c
t − dt)
+Ψa(t, Yt)−Ψa(t, Yt−)
where one to the last equality follows from (6.35) and the last one is due to (6.34).
The above implies
Ψa(1−, Y1−) = Ψa(0, 0) +
∫ 1−
0
H(t, Yt−)(dBt + dθt)− a(B1 + θ1−)
+
1
2
∫ 1−
0
Hy(t, Yt−)(d[Y, Y ]
c
t − dt)
+
∑
0<t<1
{Ψa(t, Yt)−Ψa(t, Yt−)− (H(t, Yt−)− a)∆θt}
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Combining the above and (6.31) yields
E0,z
[
W θ1
]
= E0,z
[
Ψf(Z1)(0, 0)−Ψf(Z1)(1−, X1−)− f(Z1)B1 +
∫ 1−
0
H(t, Xt−)dBt
+
1
2
∫ 1−
0
w(t, Xt−)Hx(t, Xt−)(2d[B, θ]t + d[θ, θ]
c
t)
+
∑
0<t<1
{
Ψf(Z)(t, Yt)−Ψf(Z)(t, Yt−)− (H(t, Yt−)− f(Z))∆θt
}
−
∫ 1
0
Hy(s, Ys−)w(s, Ys−) {d[B, θ]s + d[θ, θ]cs} −
∑
0<t<1
(H(t, Yt)−H(t, Yt−))∆θt
]
= E0,z
[
Ψf(Z)(0, 0)−Ψf(Z)(1−, Y1−)− 1
2
∫ 1−
0
Hy(t, Yt−)d[θ, θ]
c
t
+
∑
0<t<1
{
Ψf(Z1)(t, Yt)−Ψf(Z)(t, Yt−)− (H(t, Yt)− f(Z))∆θt
}]
≤ E0,z [Ψf(Z)(0, 0)−Ψf(Z)(1−, Y1−)]
since H is increasing, and
Ψa(t, Yt)−Ψa(t, Yt−)− (H(t, Yt)− a)∆θt =
∫ Yt
Yt−
(H(t, u)− a)du− (H(t, Yt)− a)∆θt
≤ (H(t, Yt)− a)∆Yt − (H(t, Yt)− a)∆θt = 0.
Note the inequality above becomes equality if and only if ∆θt = 0 due to the strict monotonic-
ity of H . Moreover, Ψf(Z)(1−, Y1−) ≥ 0 with an equality if and only if H(1−, Y1−) = f(Z).
Therefore, E0,z
[
W θ1
] ≤ E0,z [Ψf(Z)(0, 0)] for all admissible θs end equality is reached if and
only if the following two conditions are met.
i) θ is continuous and of finite variation.
ii) H(1−, Y1−) = f(Z), P 0,z-a.s..
Hence, the proof will be complete if one can find a sequence of absolutely continuous
admissible strategies, (θn)n≥1 such that limn→∞E
0,z
[
W θ
n
1
]
= E0,z
[
Ψf(Z1)(0, 0)
]
. However,
note that the admissibility will be immediate as soon as θ is a semimartingale since H is
assumed to be bounded.
Define
Yt := Bt +
∫ t
0
H−1(1, f(z))− Ys
1− s ds.
Recall that the above SDE has a semimartingale solution, which is a Brownian bridge con-
verging a.s. to H−1(1, f(z)).
Set
dθt =
H−1(f(z))− Yt
1− t dt
and observe that since θ is absolutely continuous, we have
E0,z[W θ] = E0,z
[
Ψf(Z)(0, 0)−Ψf(Z)(1, Y1))
]
.
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On the other hand, Ψf(Z)(1, Y1)) = 0 since H(1, Y1) = f(Z). Thus, θ is optimal.
7. Equilibrium
Let us establish the equilibrium in the case of bounded asset value.
Theorem 5. Suppose f is bounded. Define θ by setting θ0 = and
dθt =
Z − Yt
1− t dt.
Let H be the unique solution of
Ht +
1
2
Hyy = 0, H(1, y) = f(y).
Then, (H, θ) is an equilibrium.
Proof. First note that since f is bounded, H is bounded by the same constant due to its
Feynman-Kac representation. Thus, to show that θ is admissible it suffices to show that it
is a semimartingale. Indeed, given Z = z
Yt = Bt + θ
is a Brownian bridge converging to z. Thus, Y is a P 0,z-semimartingale for each z. Conse-
quently, θ is a P 0,z-semimartingale for each z. Moreover, H(1, Y1) = f(Z), P
0,z-a.s.. Thus,
θ is optimal given H .
Therefore, it remains to show thatH is a rational pricing rule. Note that if Y is a Brownian
motion in its own filtration,
H(t, y) = E[f(Y1)|FYt ]
due to the Feynman-Kac representation of H , which in turn implies H is a rational pricing
rule.
Let us next show that Y is a Brownian motion in its own filtration. This requires finding
the conditional distribution of Z given Y . Note that we are in fact in the setting of Exercise
3 with σ(s) = 0 and s(0) = 1.
Exercise 3 shows that the conditional distribution of Z given FYt is Gaussian with mean
X̂t := E[Z|FYt ] and variance v(t), where
(1− t)2v′(t) + v2(t) = 0,
and
X̂t =
∫ t
0
v(s)
1− sdNs,
where N is the innovation process.
The unique solution of the ODE with v(0) = 1 is given by v(t) = 1 − t. Consequently,
X̂ = N , i.e. X̂ is an Fy-Brownian motion. Let us now see that X̂ = Y .
Indeed,
dX̂t = dNt = dYt − X̂t − Yt
1− t dt.
In other words, X̂ solves an SDE given Y . Since this is a linear SDE, it has a unique solution,
which is given by Y itself. Hence Y is an FY -Brownian motion. 
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Some remarks are in order. The Kyle’s lambda or the market impact of trades is given by
λ(t, y) := Hy(t, y).
Thus, the flatter is f the more liquid is the market. In other words, the market’s liquidity
depends crucially on the sensitivity of insider’s valuation to changes in Z (as soon as Z is
fixed to be a standard Normal at the beginning).
Also note that the insider is indifferent among all bridge strategies that bring the market
price to f(Z) at time 1. One such bridge is when
dYt = dBt + k
Z − Yt
1− t dt
for some k while H is still as in Theorem 5. Although this is optimal for the insider, it
cannot make an equilibrium when combined with H since H(t, Yt) will not be a martingale
when Y is as above.
8. Dynamic private signal
So far we have considered the case when the informed trader has a static signal giving her
an unbiased predictor for the future asset value. However, most often the informed traders
are investment banks with research divisions. For such traders it is not realistic to assume
that they do not update their research in time.
As a simple extension of the previous model suppose the informed trader receives a Gauss-
ian signal Z such that
Zt = Z0 + σB
Z
t ,
where σ < 1 and Z0 ∼ N(0, 1−σ2). Thus, Z1 is a standard Normal random variable. We will
again assume a strictly increasing f such that f(Z1) will be the informed trader’s unbiased
estimator at time 1 for the value V of the asset that will be revealed at time 1. The objective
of the insider will be the same as (2.5).
If we go through Theorem 1, we realise that its proof does not depend on whether the
insider’s signal is static or dynamic. So the same proof can be used to show that if an
admissible absolutely continuous trading strategy brings the market price to f(Z1), it will
be optimal. Thus, (H, θ) will be an equilibrium if H is a rational pricing rule and θ is such
a bridge strategy.
To achieve this, the insider need to choose a θ such that Y is a Brownian motion in its own
filtration such that Y = Z1. Thus, if H is as in Theorem 5, (H, θ) will be an equilibrium.
Theorem 6. Let s(t) := (1− σ2)(1− t) and consider
Yt = Bt +
∫ t
0
Zr − Yr
s(r)
dr.
Then, conditional distribution of Zt given FYt is Gaussian with mean Yt and variance s(t).
In particular, Y is a Brownian motion in its own filtration.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5 and follows from Exercise 3. 
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Thus, if θ is chosen so that
dθt =
Zt − Yt
s(t)− tdt
and H is as in Theorem 5, the pair (H, θ) is an equilibrium. The proof of that θ is a
semimartingale is similar to the static bridge case and is left as an exercise.
Remark 4. Observe that the market maker’s pricing rules are the same in both static and
dynamic private signal cases. Thus, one cannot deduce the type of private information by
looking at market prices.
When the private information is dynamic, the informed trader has a signal converging to
the value of Z1. Similarly, we can consider the total order process Y as the signal of market
makers, again converging to Z1. The remaining uncertainty at time t for the informed trader
is Z1 − Zt while it is Z1 − Yt = Y1 − Yt for the market makers. The variance of Z1 − Zt is
s(t) and the variance of Y1 − Yt = 1 − t. Since s(t) < 1 − t, the remaining uncertainty is
lower for the informed trader, hence she has a competitive advantage.
9. Risk averse market makers
When the market makers are risk neutral as above, the equilibrium price evolves as a
martingale in market makers’ filtration. In [10] the market makers are allowed to be risk-
averse. More precisely, there are N market makers with exponential utility aith the same
risk aversion parameter ρ. The Bertran competition is interpreted as each market maker
gaining or losing any expected utility in the equilibrium and the total order is split equally
among them. That is, each market maker holds −Yt
N
many shares and their utility evolves
as a martingale.
Suppose that dθt = αtdt is an admissible trading strategy of the insider so that Y in its
own filtration satisfies
dYt = σdB
Y
t + αˆtdt,
where BY is an FM -Brownian motion and αˆ is the FM -optional projection of α. The best
response of the market makers is to choose a price, S, that will satisfy the zero-utility gain
condition. Let price S follow
dSt = ZtdB
Y
t + µtdt,
for some predictable process Z and an optional process µ that are to be determined by the
market makers. As there is a potential discrepancy between S1 and V , there is a possibility
of a jump in the market makers’ wealth at time 1. More precisely,
∆G1 =
Y1
N
(S1 − V ).
However, the zero-utility gain condition implies
1 = E
[
exp
(
−ρY1
N
(S1 − V )
) ∣∣∣∣FM1 ] ,
which is equivalent to
(9.36) E
[
exp
(
ρY1
N
V
) ∣∣∣∣FM1 ] = exp(ρY1N S1
)
.
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On the other hand, if we compute the dynamics of U(G) for t < 1 by Ito’s formula, we obtain
dU(Gt) = U(Gt)
ρ
N
Yt
{
σtdB
Y
t +
(
µt +
ρ
2N
Ytσ
2
t
)
dt
}
.
Reiterating the zero-utility gain condition for t < 1 shows that we must have
µt = − ρ
2N
YtZ
2
t .
Therefore, the zero-utility gain condition stipulates that the price S follows
(9.37) dSt = ZtdB
Y
t −
ρ
2N
YtZ
2
t dt,
and the market makers’ problem is to find (Z, S) to solve (9.37) with the terminal condition
(9.36) given the total demand process Y .
The BSDE in (9.37) is reminiscent of the quadratic BSDEs, which have been studied
extensively, and the connection of which to problems arising in mathematical finance is
well-established. The essential deviation of (9.37) from the BSDEs considered in the math-
ematical finance literature is that the coefficient of Z2t in (9.37) is
ρ
2N
Yt, which is in general
unbounded. This makes the direct application of the results contained in the current litera-
ture for quadratic BSDEs to (9.37) impossible. Moreover, most importantly, the boundary
value of the above BSDE is highly non-standard and depends on the solution.
However, if we turn to a Markovian equilibrium, i.e. consider St = H(t, Yt), it is natural
to expect that in equilibrium αˆt = αˆt(t, Yt, St, Zt) for some deterministic function αˆ so that
(9.38) dYt = σdB
Y
t + αˆ(t, Yt, St, Zt)dt.
Thus, if a Markovian equilibrium can be attained it will provide a Markovian solution to the
FBSDE defined by (9.36)-(9.38), where αˆ is the optimal drift chosen by the insider.
We now turn to the optimisation problem for the insider when St = H(t, Yt) for an
admissible pricing rule H . Repeating basically what we have done in earlier sections, we see
that H must satisfy a backward heat equation
Ht +
1
2
Hyy = 0,
and therefore Ito’s formula will yield that S should satisfy
dSt = Hy(t, Yt)dYt.
Combining this with (9.37) and (9.38) implies
zαˆ(t, y, s, z) = − ρ
2N
yz2,
i.e.
(9.39) αˆ(t, y, s, z) = − ρ
2N
yz
as soon as we note that z = Hy(t, y) by the choice of S.
Moreover, as before, the sole criterion of optimality for the insider is that the strategy
fulfils the bridge condition H(1, Y1) = V . Thus, if a Markovian equilibrium exists,
(9.40) dYt = σdB
Y
t −
σ2ρ
2N
YtHy(t, Yt),
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and H solves the backward heat equation above and satisfies H(1, Y1) = V .
It is shown in [10] that under suitable conditions an equilibrium exists and is characterised
by the following system of equations:
Ht +
1
2
Hyy = 0(9.41)
dYt = dβt − ρ
2N
YtHy(t, Yt)dt(9.42)
V
d
= H(1, Y1),(9.43)
with Y0 = 0 where β is a Brownian motion on some given probability space and Y is under-
stood to be a strong solution of the forward SDE. Note that the terminal condition of the
PDE is given by the distribution of Y1, which itself depends on H . Thus, the solution typi-
cally requires a fixed point argument. The proof is based on Schauder’s fixed point theorem
applied to a suitable class of measures. This in turn gives a solution of the aforementioned
forward-backward SDE.
Remark 5. It can be seen from the above system that the market makers’ inventories,
−Y , are mean-reverting in the equilibrium since Hy > 0. This is more consistent with the
empirical studies on market makers.
10. Notes and some related literature
] Characterisation of the optimal strategy of the insider as an absolutely continuous process
driving the market price to its fundamental value goes back to Back [2]. Theorem 1 proves
this characterisation in the more general setting of this chapter using techniques from [30]
and [15].
Dynamic private signal for the informed investor was first considered in continuous time
in [4]. More recently, Campi, C¸etin and Danilova [8] developed a Dynamic Markov bridge
theory to study equilibrium when the insider’s signal is a general diffusion process. However,
the existence of equilibrium in general - even in a Markovian framework- is till an open
question. See the discussion in [8] in this respect.
Default risk was first incorporated into the Kyle model in by Campi and C¸etin [7]. A
generalisation of this framework with dynamic signal was done in [9].
The case of risk averse insider with exponential utility was first studied by Holden and
Subrahmanyam [20] in discrete time. The authors characterised the equilibrium as the
solution of a system of equations, which they were able to solve numerically. This model was
brought to continuous time by Baruch [5], who limited the insider’s strategies to absolutely
continuous ones with speed of trading being an affine function of equilibrium price.
Holden and Subrahmanyam [19] allow multiplicity of insiders having the same information
trading in the market. They found via numerical analysis that the competition among the
insiders lead to a faster revelation of their private information. In fact in the continuous
time limit of their model the insiders would reveal their information immediately. This
observation led to the study of the case when the insiders’ private signals are not perfectly
correlated. This was first done by Foster and Viswanathan [16] in discrete time and later
extended to continuous time by Back, Cao and Willard [3].
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Although generalisation of the noise traders’ demand process has attracted relatively
less attention in the literature, there are nevertheless several works that address this is-
sue. Volatility of the noise traders fluctuating randomly over time was considered in the
recent work of Colin-Dufresne and Fos [13]. Biagini et al. [6] studied the Kyle’s model when
the noise demand follows a fractional Brownian motion. Corcuera et al. [14] in the context
of noise demand process being a Le´vy process concluded that an equilibrium cannot exist
when a jump component is present. Indeed C¸etin and Xing [12] have shown that the insider
must follow a mixed strategy, i.e. apply an additional randomisation, in the equilibrium
when the noise buy and sell orders follow Poisson processes.
Empirical studies suggest that a model with risk averse market makers is more realistic.
However, there are only two papers that tackle this problem in the literature. Subrahmanyam
[29] allowed the market makers to be risk averse in a one-period Kyle model. C¸etin and
Danilova [10] have shown that an equilibrium exists in the continuous time version of the
Kyle model with risk averse market makers. Existence of an equilibrium with dynamic inside
information and risk averse market makers is still an open question.
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